I Had a Vision

2015-2-5 Superbowl img01The media has called the Seahawks’ decision “the stupidest play call in Super Bowl history”—but it should instead be known as one of the most impressive and unexpected individual efforts by a defender in Super Bowl history. Critics argue that the Seahawks should have relied on their talented running back Marshawn Lynch to win the Super Bowl. Instead, the Seahawks’ game plan took the entire drive into account and aimed to maximize the team’s productivity on all three plays. By hammering the coaches, instead of acknowledging their logic, the media missed out on the great story of Malcolm Butler’s success.

First, consider the logic of the Seahawks’ decision. With 1:06 left in the game, the Seahawks had the ball at the one-yard line. As per usual, they had 40 seconds to snap the ball for the next play, or they would be penalized for delay of game. At this point, it would have made sense for the Patriots to call a time-out, because the Seahawks were exceptionally likely to score with three cracks at the end zone from the one-yard line as a team with a top-notch record in short yardage situations. With the score at 28-24 and only enough time to score once, the Seahawks needed a touchdown to take the lead. Presuming they scored a touchdown, they would then take a 2-point lead, kick the extra point, and finish with a 3-point lead. They would then kick it back to the Patriots.

By calling a timeout, the Patriots would guarantee themselves enough time to answer with a field goal and send the game to overtime. Barring that, if they stopped the Seahawks’ drive, the Patriots could run the clock and win the Super Bowl. At that point, the Patriots’ goal was twofold: a) stop the Seahawks from scoring in one of two ways: i) achieve a conventional turnover of possession (a recovered fumble or interception) or ii) force the Seahawks to run out of downs or time; b) score enough points to answer the Seahawks and remain in the game. To maximize their ability to succeed at either of these goals—especially option (b)—the Patriots’ safest bet appeared to be taking a timeout. The Seahawks would probably score, and the Patriots would have a full minute to answer with a field goal.

Instead, the Patriots let the play clock trickle down, doing nothing to stop it. The Seahawks also did nothing to stop the clock, which set up a crucial decision: The Seahawks had only one timeout remaining, having just used their second timeout after getting to the five-yard line. Their goal was to maximize their collective chances of scoring on all three downs—and for that, they needed the flexibility to call either runs or passes. Either option could score a touchdown—but a failed pass play would result in an incompletion, stopping the clock, whereas a failed run play would result in the clock continuing to tick. In order to make best use of all three plays, the Seahawks’ best strategy would be to maintain unpredictability so the other team would be stuck between responding to runs and passes. Without knowing which was coming, the Patriots could be caught flatfooted. This is the foundational principle of modern American football.

Multiple factors influenced the coaches’ ultimate decision. With under 30 seconds remaining on the clock, the Seahawks could not afford to run the football on both of their first two plays and fail to score. Why? In addition to 3-7 seconds elapsing on each play, at the end of a running play in which the running back neither scored nor ran out of bounds, the clock would continue to run. The Seahawks had only one timeout remaining, so they could not stop the clock after two successive running plays, nor would they have had time to run a third play. The clock refused the Seahawks the option of running the ball on all three plays.

The need to remain unpredictable also inclined the Seahawks to pass instead of running the ball on second down. If the Seahawks failed to score on a run, they would have no choice but to pass on the next play. By passing on second down, they left both options available on third or fourth. They could run the football and then use their timeout, or try to surprise the other team with another pass.

The individual strengths and weaknesses of the teams themselves factor into the coaches’ decision, too. The Seahawks have two phenomenal assets that got them to the Super Bowl in the first place: a tremendous quarterback and a tremendous running back. The quarterback, Russell Wilson, responds with his best performances in high pressure situations, as demonstrated by his 10 career fourth quarter comebacks. In Wilson’s three-year career, he has won all ten of his match-ups with Super Bowl-winning quarterbacks. Wilson also has a great talent for carrying the ball himself as a surprise tactic on passing plays. His running back, Marshawn Lynch, is considered among the most difficult to tackle, especially in short yardage situations. The Seahawks were no doubt planning to hand the ball off to Lynch on successive downs if necessary.

The Seahawks also needed to consider the play’s chances of failure. Up until this point, no pass thrown from the 1-yard line had been intercepted all season. It was far more likely for a run play to result in a fumble—which would have ended their drive and their Super Bowl aspirations as definitively as an interception. Wilson’s ability to avoid mistakes, throw the football, and run the football, plus the statistical odds against an interception at the one-yard line, all amounted to enough of a counterbalance to the risks of the play.

Finally, it is possible that the Seahawks had in the back of their minds the NFC Championship game. In that game, which earned them a spot in the Super Bowl, the Seahawks’ comeback against the Packers was accomplished after their opponents failed to convert two plays from the one-yard line by running the ball—an identical situation to what the Seahawks were facing now.

The Seahawks approached the play by coming out in a balanced formation, ready to run or pass. The Patriots came out in a defensive formation optimized for stopping the run, leaving the Patriots open to a pass and vastly lowering the Seahawks’ odds of scoring on a run. The Patriots had decided they would rather face the pass than the run, so they set up a situation where it was the Seahawks’ best decision to pass instead of running. It would have been foolish for the Seahawks to pass up the window of opportunity created by the Patriots.

Based on these calculations, the Seahawks threw the football; it was intercepted; the Patriots won.

How did it happen? The Seahawks ran a “legal” pick play. In this play, two receivers face two defenders. Each defender is covering their opposing number. The first receiver runs into the second defender’s path—as the first defender follows him, and the second defender collides with him, the second receiver is left uncovered and wide open for a split second. In order to avoid a penalty, the receiver has to stop in front of the defender so that the defender runs into him—crucial, because the Seahawks could not have afforded to incur a penalty. The Seahawks’ first receiver (Jermaine Kearse) failed to execute this tricky play, thanks in part to the defender (Brandon Browner) impeding his path. The second defender was left free.

Meanwhile, the Seahawks receiver, Ricardo Lockette, was heading for the ball. Seahawks quarterback Russell Wilson had made a perfect throw. Instead of extending his arms to catch it, Lockette jumped forward so that he could cradle the ball against his chest.

But the Patriots had made a last-minute substitution of a cornerback for linebacker Akeem Ayers, raising their defensive capability against the pass, after the Seahawks had called the pick play. This cornerback and Lockette both had a clear path to the ball, but the cornerback was the one who stretched out for the pass. He intercepted the pass, the ball belonged to the Patriots, and time was up. That last-minute substitution was a young man by the name of Malcolm Butler.

No one knows much about Butler, because the media rarely covered him before or after the Super Bowl. Somehow Butler made his way from being undrafted out of college, onto the Patriots’ roster, to the center of the most critical moment of the entire season. Since there is not much verifiable information available, his reaction after the game gives us the best insight. On the sideline, as the clock expired and the game ended, Butler’s teammates came to congratulate him. He was trapped between elation and bursting into tears. A few minutes later, a reporter snagged him for a brief interview. Obviously overcome with emotion, Butler choked out that he “had a vision of making a great play” and considered himself “blessed.” The entire season had come down to him, and he was in shock.

Consider that two plays ago, Butler had put forth a tremendous effort only to be foiled by freak chance. With 1:14 to go and the clock running, the Seahawks had snapped the ball to Wilson for a pass. He looked deep and threw to a receiver (Jermaine Kearse) covered by Butler. As both players leapt into the air, Butler reached up and tipped the football harmlessly away—or so he thought. Instead, the ball bounced off the feet of the fallen Kearse. Kearse juggled the ball and recovered possession, in an unconventional but perfectly legal 33-yard catch. Butler immediately tackled him to the ground, but the damage was done. The Seahawks were five yards from the end zone.

After a Marshawn Lynch run that got the Seahawks to the one-yard line, Butler had his revenge. He reacted within half a second of the ball being snapped to sprint to the spot where Wilson threw the ball—an impossible reaction unless he had instantly recognized the play based on the Seahawks formation. Thanks to his coaches’ prediction of the Seahawks’ next move, Butler had specifically prepared for that play. As it turns out, the Patriots’ scout team offense had practiced that very play against Butler in the two weeks preceding the Super Bowl—and had beaten him with it. This time, he was ready.

Butler’s story is as yet unfinished. The media failed him and NFL fans by focusing instead on a shallow, click-bait version of events.

The Green Monk

About The Green Monk

They say counting is easy, but the Green Monk has noticed that people struggle with it all the time. Life is full of these little contradictions that few people bother to observe. Stay tuned for intelligent analysis, dry humor, and unshakable conviction.

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